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IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE OF UTAH
MOUNTAIN STATES CASING SERVICE
and/or STATE INSURANCE FUND,

:
:

Defendants/Appellants,:
vs.

DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS'
BRIEF

:

JERRY L. McKEAN and/or
:
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH, :
Supreme Court No. 20508
Applicant/Respondents.:
BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS/APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The issue presented on appeal is whether an injury the
applicant sustained while in his home is compensable under the
Workers' Compensation Act of Utah.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On January 8, 1982, while working for Mountain States
Casing Service in Coalville, Utah, Jerry L. McKean, the applicantrespondent herein, caught his right arm in a drilling apparatus.
The arm was completely severed in the accident.

(R. 1-3).

After impressive surgical intervention, the limb was saved.

Six

or seven subsequent surgeries were required, however, leaving the
applicant with little or no feeling in the arm.

(R. 43, 45,

67-68, 98).
The State Insurance Fund paid

all medical bills,

temporary total disability compensation and certain other expenses
following theDigitized
accident.
(R. 4, 9-12, 58-61, 116-117).
by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

i

On or about April 6f 1932, the applicant seriously
burned his right hand while engaged in various activities at his
home, including working on a steam heater, working on headers to
an automobile exhaust system, and cooking on a stove. (R. 66-67).
The injury was rather serious because applicant apparently did not
feel any heat on his hand when it was burned.
117).

(R. 31-32, 43, 45,

This burn injury necessitated skin graft surgery.

The

applicant was admitted to the University of Utah Hospital on April
13, 1982, for the surgery and released on April 19, 1982.

(R. 92,

117) .
The State Insurance Fund denied liability for treatment
of the burn injury, contending that the causal connection between
the burn injury and the earlier industrial injury of January 8,
1982, was broken.

(R. 117). A hearing was held on the matter on

January 14, 1985.

(R. 16-87).

The Administrative Law Judge issued his Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on January 23, 1985, holding
that State Insurance Fund was liable for expenses resulting from
the applicant's burn injury.

(R. 98-102).

A Motion for Review was submitted by State Insurance
Fund and Mountain States Casing Service, defendant-appellants
herein, on January 29, 1985.

(R. 104-108).

On February 6, 1985,

the Administrative Law Judge's Order was affirmed by the Industrial Commission in its Denial of Motion for Review.

(R. 110).

Appellants submitted a Petition for Review and Docketing

2
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Statement to this Court on March 4, 1985.

(R. 112-133).

Appel-

lants now submit their Supreme Court Brief in this matter.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The Administrative Law Judge found that Mr. McKean's
burn injury occurred

within the so-called

employment" and was thus compensable.

"quasi-course of

The doctrine of quasi-

course of employment/ however, is not part of Utah law.

In any

case, McKean's injury does not properly come within the quasicourse of employment; and, hence, the injury is not compensable on
that ground.

Neither is McKean's injury compensable on the basis
•I

of general rules concerning subsequent injuries.

The chain of

causation leading from McKean's original industrial injury was
broken by his own negligent conduct.
\

ARGUMENT

|

POINT I

THE INJURY IN QUESTION WAS NOT THE RESULT OF
AN INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT AND WAS NOT SUSTAINED
DURING THE "QUASI-COURSE OF EMPLOYMENT".
In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
affirmed by the Industrial Commission, the Administrative Law
Judge based his conclusion of law on Professor Larson's analysis
of the "quasi-course of employment".

Appellants contend, first,

that Larson's concept of "quasi-course of employment" is not part
of Utah law and, second, that the Administrative Law Judge, in any
event, misapplied Larson's concept in the instant case.

3
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No Utah case is cited anywhere in the Administrative Law
Judge's Findings of Fact or in the Industrial Commission's Denial
of Motion for Review to suggest that Utah has adopted Professor
Larson's concept of "quasi-course of emloyment" activities.
Appellants note that at least a minority of states have rejected
Larson's concept.

According

to Larson, activities in the

so-called "quasi-course of employment" are activities undertaken
by the employee following an industrial injury that, although they
occur outside the time and space limits of the employment, "are
nevertheless related to the employment in the sense that they are
necessary or reasonable activities that would not have been
UndgytaK^n bn£ Z&I ths

coflpengabls injury."

Section 13.11(d) (emphasis added).

Larson, Vol. 1,

Larson illustrates activities

in the "quasi-course of employment" with the example of trips to
and from a physician's office for treatment of the industrial
injury.

Larson, Vol. 1, Section 13.11(d).
A number of states, however, have disallowed compen-

sation for injuries in such circumstances.

In Anderson v. Chatham

Electronics, 70 N.J. Super. 202, 175 A.2d 256 (1961), the court
rejected the quasi-course of employment argument.
the employee

In that case,

sustained injuries in an auto collision while

returning from her doctor's office where she had gone for a
medical clearance slip required by her employer before returning
to work following surgery unrelated to her employment.

The court

held that those injuries did not "arise out of and in the course
of the employment."
4

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Kiaer v. Idaho Corp., 85 Idaho 424, 380 P.2d 208 (1963)
involved an initial work-related injury and a subsequent automobile accident which aggravated the first injury.

The auto

accident occurred on a day when the claimant was not working for
her employer, but while she was enroute to a doctor for treatment
of injuries sustained in the industrial accident.

The Idaho

Supreme Court found the auto accident did not arise out of and in
the course of claimant's employment, because there was no causal
connection between

the industrial injury and the accident.

Following Farmers Gin Co, V, Cpopqr# 147 Okl. 29, 294 P. 108
(1930), the Idaho Court found the highway collision to be an
intervening cause breaking the causal connection between the
injury and the employment.
The court in Bankers Investment Co. v. Boyd, Okl., 560
P.2d 958 (1977) came to a similar conclusion.

In that case, the

claimant was traveling to a hospital for treatment of a prior
industrial injury when she was involved in an automobile accident.

Since the auto accident occurred six months after the

claimant's termination of employment, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that the resulting injuries neither arose out of nor occurred
in the course of employment and were, therefore, not compensable.
Even if Utah, in an appropriate case, would adopt
Professor Larson's concept of quasi-course activities, the concept
does not apply in the instant case.

The Administrative Law Judge

misapplied the concept in his Findings of Fact.

The Adminis-

trative Law Judge cited the following passage from Larson, in
5
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which Larson explains his concept of the quasi-course of employment:
. . . activities undertaken by the employee
following upon his injury which, although they
take place outside the time and space limits
of the employment, and would not be considered
employment activities for usual purposes, are
nevertheless related to the employment in the
sense that they are necessary QC reasonable
activities that WQU14 HQt hafyg been qn<tertaken

bgt fop the QQinpensafrlg injmry.

Larson,

Vol, 1, Section 13.11(d); R. 99 (emphasis
added).
Prom this passage, the Administrative Law Judge inferred that any
necessary or reasonable activities would be included in Larson's
quasi-course of employment.

Accordingly, the Administrative Law

Judge found that HcKean's activities on the day of his injury
(working on an exhaust header, working on a steam radiator,
cooking on a stove) were entirely reasonable.

The Administrative

Law Judge stated:
Applying the foregoing to the instant matter,
the question becomes: was the applicant's
conduct on or about April 6, 1982 reasonable
such that his activities may be considered
reasonable or necessary. Considering all of
the circumstances of the case, I do not find
it unreasonable that the applicant would have
been working on his car on April 6, 1982 nor
do I find the applicant's conduct unreasonable
in preparing his meals, since he and his wife
were separated at that time. Finally, I do
not see anything unreasonable about the
applicant attempting to repair an inoperative
steam radiator for the purpose of having heat
in the home. Rather, each of these activities
are [sic] reasonable, usual daily activities
of living. (R. 100).
It is clear fiom this passage that the Administrative
Law Judae misconstrued

Larson's concept of quasi-course of
6
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employment.

Larson does not speak of activities which are

"necessary or reasonable" simplicitor.

Larson says, " . . . neces-

sary or reasonable activities that would not have been undertaken
but for the compensable injury."

Larson goes on to state,

"'Reasonable' at this point relates not to the method used, but to
the category of activity itself."
13.11(d).

Larson, Vol. 1, Section

When Larson speaks of "necessary or reasonable acti-

vities", he has in mind those activities that are necessitated by
the employee's original industrial injury.

This is made clear by

the examples he gives, such as the example of trips to and from a
physician's office for treatment of the industrial injury.1
Larson, Vol. 1, Section 13.11(d).

Activities of this kind, of

course, are necessitated (i.e., made necessary and reasonable) by
the employee's injury.

In contrast, the activities undertaken by

Mr. McKean on April 6, 1982, were not necessitated by his original
industrial injury.

McKean's activities were entirely unrelated to

his original injury.

As the Administrative Law Judge correctly

noted, each of McKean's activities was a normal activity of daily
living.

(R. 100). Consequently, Mr. McKean's activities were not

activities within the quasi-course of employment; and, accord-

x

Cases exemplifying quasi-course of employment activities, in
addition to those cited in Larson, are:
Wood v. State
Ace. Ins. Fund, 30 Or. App. 1103, 569 P.2d 648 (1977) (Injury
sustained during vocational rehabilitation program designed to
restore employee to full employability after initial on-the-job
injury was itself compensable); Whitington v. Indus. Com'n, 10
Ariz. App. 461, 459 P.2d 740 (1969) (Compensation paid on
auto-accident injury which occurred while employee was driving to
attend medical consultation concerning his earlier industrial
accident).
7
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ingly,

the

burn

injury

resulting

from

o n e o r more of

those

a c t i v i t i e s i s n o t compensable.
POINT I I
THE CHAIN OF CAUSATION LEADING PROM THE
ORIGINAL INDUSTRIAL INJURY WAS BROKEN BY THE
APPLICANT'S OWN NEGLIGENT CONDUCT.
The
injuries

general

rule

regarding

the

compensability

of

s u b s e q u e n t t o an o r i g i n a l i n d u s t r i a l i n j u r y i s s t a t e d by

P r o f e s s o r Larson as f o l l o w s :
The b a s i c r u l e i s t h a t a s u b s e q u e n t
i n j u r y , whether an a g g r a v a t i o n of t h e o r i g i n a l
i n j u r y o r a new a n d d i s t i n c t i n j u r y , i s
c o m p e n s a b l e i f i t i s t h e d i r e c t and n a t u r a l
r e s u l t of a c o m p e n s a b l e p r i m a r y
injury.
Larson, Vol. 1, Section 1 3 . 1 1 .
As n o t e d a t P o i n t I , Larson d i s t i n g u i s h e s a c t i v i t i e s
the

quasi-course

regard

to

employee
Section

such

will

of employment;
activities,

break

13.11(d).

and Larson m a i n t a i n s

only

the chain

intentional

of c a u s a t i o n .

With r e g a r d

that,

conduct
Larson,

to non-quasi-course

in

with

by t h e
V o l . 1,

activities,

however, t h e e m p l o y e e ' s n e g l i g e n c e i s enough t o break t h e c h a i n of
causation.

About such n o n - q u a s i - c o u r s e a c t i v i t i e s , Larson w r i t e s :
When, h o w e v e r , t h e i n j u r y f o l l o w i n g t h e
i n i t i a l compensable i n j u r y does n o t a r i s e o u t
of a q u a s i - c o u r s e a c t i v i t y r . . . , t h e c h a i n
of c a u s a t i o n may be deemed broken by e i t h e r

intentional QC negligent claimant miscgn^ugt.

Larson, Vol. 1,
(emphasis added).
The i n s t a n t
Professor

Section

case f a l l s

Larson has c o l l e c t e d

member c o n t r i b u t i n g

to l a t e r
8

13.11(d),

within

the

3-380

c a t e g o r y of

under t h e heading of

fall

or o t h e r

injury".
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cases

"Weakened
Larson,

Vol, 1, Section 13.12.
disallowing compensation.

Larson cites cases both allowing and
The operative distinction between the

cases is whether or not the claimant was negligent.

In one case,

for instancef the claimant/ because of a compensable eye injury,
was required to wear dark glasses.

At 11:00 at nightf in his own

home f he fell down the stairs because of the obscuring of his
vision by the glasses.

The aggravation of his eye condition

resulting from the fall was held compensable.

The claimant in the

case was not found to have been negligent/ however.

Randolph

V, B t J.

Du PQnt D<* Nerooyirg CP,, 130 N.J.L. 353/ 33 A#2d 301

(1943).

A contrary result was arrived at in Sullivan v. 3. &

A. Constr, , Inc. , 122 N.Y.S.2d 571, rev'g 307 N.Y. 161/ 120 N.E.2d
694 (1954) .
negligent.

In this case, the claimant was found to have been
The claimant had previously suffered two compensable

knee injuries; and/ as a result of these accidents, his right knee
occasionally
useless.

"locked"/

rendering the right leg practically

While driving an automobile/ his right knee locked; he

was unable to apply his brakes; and an accident occurred.

The

injuries sustained in the automobile accident were held noncompensable/ on the ground that claimant's own act of driving with
knowledge of his condition broke the chain of causation between
the industrial accident and the car crash.

Appellants contend

that the instant case is much more like Sullivan than Randolph.
Appellants contend that Mr. McKean was negligent when he engaged
in the activities of April 6, 1982, without taking any precautions
against burning his hand.
9
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i

Utah cases are consistent with the categories and
distinctions set out by Professor Larson.

i

The implication that

negligence will cut off the chain of causation is found in
Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Indus, Com'n of Utah, Utah, 275 P. 777
(1929).
job.

In that case, an employee injured his back while on the

<

He went to a doctor who misdiagnosed his condition as

rheumatism and advised
extracted.

the employee to have all his teeth

Following the physician's orders, the employee had his

teeth extracted.

He then sought compensation for these expenses.

Holding that the additional expenses were compensable, the Utah
Supreme Court stated:
So, though it be assumed that the physician
who diagnosed the employee's condition as that
of rheumatism was . . . incompetent, and that
in consequence thereof the employee's teeth
were extracted, yet, inasmuch as no claim is

..made that the employee was negligent in
seeking or employing such physician, the
aggravated . . . condition of the employee so
occasioned by the . . . unskillfulness of such
physician cannot be said to be due to an
independent and intervening cause. . . . 257
P. at 779 (emphasis added).
Two relatively recent Utah cases held the applicant's
subsequent

injury to be compensable.

In Fruehauf Trailer

Co. v. Indus, Com'n, 16 Utah.2d 95, 396 P.2d 409 (1964), the
applicant injured his knee while working and developed thrombophlebitis as a result.

Later, he developed a gall bladder condi-

tion and pulmonary embolus.

The Utah Supreme Court found that

there was sufficient evidence of a causal relationship between the
previous, industrial injury and the pulmonary embolus to uphold
the reward of compensation.
10
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{

the applicant's subsequent medical problems being brought about by
any negligence on his part.

Likewise, there was no issue of the

applicant's negligence in Perchelli v. Utah State Indus. Com'n, 25
Utah 2d 58, 475 P.2d 835 (1970).

In that case, the applicant had

injured his back in an industrial injury.

Some years later, his

condition was triggered by a sneeze into a disc herniation, which
required surgery.

The medical evidence was that the applicant had

a progressive back condition due to the work-related injury and
that if the claimant had not sneezed, some other major or minor
event would have eventually necessitated the surgery.
In his commentary on the case, Larson holds that the
result in Perchelli is "clearly correct."

Larson points out that

the sneezing incident should not obscure the true nature of the
case, which is merely the further medical complication flowing
from a compensable injury.

Larson notes that if the herniation

had occurred while the applicant rolled over in his sleep, its
characterization as a natural sequel to the compensable injury
would have seemed obvious.

Finally, Larson distinguishes the case

from one involving negligence by the applicant:
A different question is presented, of course,
when the triggering activity is itself rash in
the light of claimant's knowledge of his
condition. Larson, Vol. 1, Section 13.11(a).
Appellants contend that the instant case is easily
distinguishable from Fruehauf and Perchelli in that applicant
McKean was negligent in not protecting his right arm and hand
during his activities of April 6, 1982.

11
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I

In his Findings of Fact, the Administrative Lav/ Judge
placed great weight on the fact that Mr. McKeanfs physician told

i

him that some feeling should return to his right arm and hand.
The Administrative

Law Judge concluded that McKean was not

negligent in working with hot objects

(exhaust headers, steam

i

radiator, stove), because he did not know his arm was without
feeling.

The Administrative Law Judge stated:
Based on his lack of prior knowledge, the
applicant's activities of the date in question, April 6, 1982 do not appear to the
Administrative Law Judge to have been unreasonable in light of all the facts and circumstances. Therefore, the Administrative Law
Judge finds that the chain of causation
between the industrial injury of January 8,
1982 and the burn injury sustained by the
applicant on or about April 6, 1982 has not
been broken by any intentional or negligent
misconduct by the applicant. (R. 100).
Regardless of what Mr. McKean's physician told him he

might expect about recovering some feeling in his arm, it is
impossible to believe that Mr. McKean did not know, of his own
immediate experience, whether he had feeling in his arm at the
time of his activities of April 6, 1982.

Indeed, from McKeanfs

testimony, it is perfectly clear that he did know that his arm was
numb.

(R. 45, 67-68).
Although Mr. McKean did and should have undertaken

activities of daily living, his conduct of those activities should
not have been negligent.

Since he was experiencing numbness in

his right arm and hand, he should have taken reasonable precautions against further injury.

The fact that McKean burned his

hand and was never aware of the burning when it occurred, shows
12
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i

'

negligence zg£

ipsa loquitur.

At the very least, Mr. McKean

should have protected his hand while working with hot objects with
some sort of protective covering, such as a heat-resistant glove.
Mr. McKean's burn injury was a result of his own
negligent conduct.

This negligence broke the chain of causation

between the original industrial accident of January 8, 1982, and
the burn injury of April 6, 1982.

As such, neither Mr. McKean's

employer nor State Insurance Fund should be held liable for the
expenses incurred by Mr. McKean for the treatment of the burn
injury to his right hand.
CQNCLqglQN
Mr. McKean's subsequent burn injury does not come within
Professor Larson's quasi-course of employment.

Furthermore, the

chain of causation from McKean's original industrial injury was
cut off by McKean's own negligent conduct.

Accordingly, appel-

lants request that the Industrial Commission's Denial of Motion
for Review, ordering compensation for McKean's burn injury, be
reversed.
DATED this

day of April, 1985.
BLACK & MOORE

l^^^^^A-^-^-^^-^-^MARY A. RUDOLPH
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of
above and foregoing Brief of Defendants/Appellants was placed
the United States mail, with first-class postage thereon, on
*J

lzl-L

(

^

day of April, 1985, addressed as follows:
Mary Corporon
Chris Nichols
Attorney for Respondent
142 East 200 South, #300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Industrial Commission of Utah
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No:

85000085

JERRY MCKEAN,
*

FINDINGS OF FACT

Applicant,
i

*

*

vs,
MOUNTAIN STATES CASING SERVICE
and/or STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER

*
*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 160 East
300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on January 1A, 1985, at
10:00 o'clock a.m.; same being pursuant through order and
notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Applicant was present and represented by Chris Nichols,
Attorney at Law.
Defendants were represented by Dennis V. Lloyd, Attorney at
Law.

At conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the State Insurance Fund,
by and through counsel, made a motion to dismiss the applicants claim for
medical expenses incurred as the result of the surgery he received on April
13, 1982, for a burn received while at home. In addition, the State Insurance
Fund also made a motion for the allowance of an offset against the applicants
temporary total disability benefits, for sums received in lieu of payment for
janitorial
services.
The motions were taken under advise by the
Administrative Law Judge, being fully advised in the premises, the
Administrative Law Judge is prepared'to enter the following.
FINDINGS OF FACT:
This case involves the tragic amputation of the arm of the applicant,
Jerry McKean. This industrial injury was sustained on January 8, 1982 while
the applicant was working for Mountain States Casing in Coalville, Utah. As a
result of his injury, the applicants arm was caught in the tongs of the
drilling apparatus, and was amputated. After gallant surgical intervention,
the limb was saved, however the applicant has had six or seven surgeries to
the arm as a result. The State Insurance Fund, to its credit, has paid the
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applicant all temporary total disability benefits which have been indicated
to date. However, the dispute causing the need for a hearing, revolves around
the applicants injury he sustained while at home in Shoshone, Idaho on or
about April 6, 1982. On that date, the applicant was at home and had worked
on his car installing an exhaust header. That day he also worked on a steam
radiator in his house which was not working. The applicant also testified
that he had cooked his meals that day. When the applicant had a bath that
evening he noticed no problems with his hand, but the following morning he had
a blister on his right thumb. The applicant testified that since the injury,
he has been suffering from diminished sensation in his right hand, but that he
had been told by his doctor that the feeling should come back, and that if it
did not surgery would be undertaken towards that end. However, the applicant
was not told to restrict his activities of living.
Following the discovery of the blister on his thumb, the applicant
reported for medical treatment to Dr. Leonard, and at that time was advised
that he would need surgery or else he would possibly lose half of his hand.
The applicant was admitted to the University of Utah Hospital on April 13,
1982 for skin graft surgery, and was eventually released on April 19, 1982.
The State Insurance Fund has denied liability for this treatment, contending
that the causal connection between that injury and the industrial injury of
January 8f 1982 was broken.
As support for their position, the State
Insurance Fund relies on Professor Larsen1s Workmen* s Compensation.
In
section 13.00 of the same, Professor Larsen sets forth the general
considerations
governing
cases
involving
the
"range
of
compensable
consequences0:
When the primary injury is shown to have arisen out of
or in the course of employment, every natural consequence
that flows from the injury likewise arises out of the
employment, unless it is the result of independent
intervening cause attributable to claimant's own
intentional conduct.
In further talking about this area, Professor Larsen has contrived a
new concept, which he calls "Quasi-Course of Employment." In this regard, the
expression means:
activities undertaken by the employee following upon his
injury which, although they take place outside the time
and space limits of the employment, and would not be
considered employment activities for usual purposes,
are nevertheless related to the employment in the sense
that they are necessary or reasonable activities that
would not have been undertaken but for the compensable
injury.
In other words, when an injury arises out of
causal chain is not broken by mere negligence
performance of that activity, but rather is only
conduct of the applicant which might be regarded
prohibited by the employer.

Quasi-Course activity, the
of the applicant in the
broken by the intentional
as expressly or impliedly
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Applying the forgoing to the instant matter, the question becomes: was the
applicant's conduct on or about April 6, 1982 reasonable such that his
activities may be considered reasonable or necessary. Considering all of the
circumstances of the case, I do not find it unreasonable that the applicant
would have been working on his car on April 6, 1982 nor do I find the
applicant's conduct unreasonable in preparing his meals, since he and his wife
were separated at that time. Finally, I do not see anything unreasonable
about the applicant attempting to repair an inoperative steam radiator for the
purpose of having heat in the home. Rather, each of these activities are
reasonable, usual daily activities of living.
Had the applicant burned his hand prior to the injury of April 6,
1982 then, the State Insurance Fund's point would be well taken and his case
would be analogous to those cited by Professor Larsen. For example, one of
the cases cited by Professor Larsen involves a claimant who knew he had a
history of an unstable knee.
Possessed of this knowledge, this claimant
proceeded to climb down a flight of stairs to take out the trash, whereupon an
injury was sustained. Compensation in that instance was denied, and properly
so. However, the evidence in the file before me does not inescapably point to
that conclusion or result. Rather, the applicant testified that his doctor
had advised him that his feeling would come back in the arm, and the applicant
testified that he did in fact have some feeling in the arm. Based on his lack
of prior knowledge, the applicant's activities of the date in question, April
6, 1982 do not appear to the Administrative Law Judge to have been
unreasonable in light of all of the facts and circumstances. Therefore, the
Administrative Law Judge finds that the chain of causation between the
i industrial injury January 8, 1982 and the burn injury sustained by the
".•*" applicant on or about April 6, 1982 has not been broken by any intentional or
7'.. • negligent misconduct by the applicant. Rather, his injury of April 6, 1982 is
an unfortunate but natural consequence of his industrial injury of January 8,
1
1982.
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The defendants, by and through counsel, also made a motion for an
offset of the value of the rental fee of the applicant's present living
quarters has against their liability for temporary total disability.
The
applicant testified that he was staying in a downstairs apartment of a
building which has been converted to professional offices. The applicant's
testimony was that his wife works five days a week at the job of cleaning
these offices, and that he works two days per week, which consists of emptying
the trash. In addition the applicant is also required to contribute a $50.00
per month improvement to the apartment. Based on the applicant's testimony,
and considering the equities of the case, including the fact that the
applicant is planning on returning to his home in Yakima, Washington, the
Administrative Law Judge finds that there is insufficient evidence to grant
the relief sought by the State Insurance Fund.
Based on the applicant's
testmony, it would appear to the Administrative Law Judge that the bulk of the
work is being done by his wife such that an offset of the applicant temporary
total disability benefits would not be proper.

\t'
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the State Insurance
; Fund, by and through counsel, indicated its willingness to pay the applicant
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travel reimbursement
for seven trips to Salt Lake City from Yakima,
Washington, payable at the rate of 16i per mile and based on the mileage as
indicated in the road atlas. The State Insurance Fund has also agreed to pay
the applicant's future medical expenses for his treatments in Washington,
subject to the Utah Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule. The Administrative Law
Judge fully explained the manifestations of this situation to the applicant,
so that there would be no misunderstanding in this regard.
The State
Insurance Fund also agreed to pay the applicant for five nights of per diem at
$22.50 per night as reimbursement for trips he made from Yakima, Washington to
Salt Lake City which involved overnight stays.
*

„

'

•

I \
i,» ,
,.,,
«'V
V \.
- s
'< *:

•

•

.

*

Finally, the applicant produced a W2 form for 1981 which he testified
covered wages for the period November 24, 1981 to and including the end of the
year. Based on that W2 statement, the applicant was earning wages sufficient
to entitle him to the maximum award for temporary total disability benefits of
$256.00 per week. The State Insurance Fund has heretofore paid the applicant
temporary total compensation at the rate of $248.00 per week, thereby creating
an $8.00 per week underpayment.
The State Insurance Fund is to make the
necessary adjustments to the applicant's compensation rate, and the difference
should be awarded to him in a lump sum.

• *.
•w
M

CONCLUSION OF LAW:

t

-;.
Jerry McKean is entitled to workmen's compensation benefits for the
fe ; industrial accident sustained on January 8, 1982, which accident arose out of
™ ; •"' or during the course his scope of his employment with the defendants, Mountain
] •]'
States Casing.
ORDER:
:••!*

"',?/'<
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IT IS THEREFORE ORDER THAT defendants, Mountain states Casing and or
State Insurance Fund, pay Jerry McKean compensation at the rate of $256.00 per
wee
k f o r temporary total disability benefits, said benefits to continue until
the applicant's condition stabilizes. Since the applicant has heretofore been
paid temporary total disability benefits at the rate of $248.00 per week,
there has been an $8.00 per week underpayment of benefits, which should be
paid to the applicant in a lump sum.

:

' '

IT IS FURTHER
State Insurance Fund,
*:v . , industrial injury of
J'j3J "» with the Medical and
V-' Utah.

ORDERED that defendants, Mountain States Casing and or
pay all medical expenses incurred as the result of the
January 8, 1982; said expenses to be paid in accordance
Surgical Fee Schedule of the Industrial Commission of

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Mountain States
or State Insurance Fund, pay all medical expenses incurred as the
;;;.\ the injury of or about April 6, 1982, said expenses to be paid in
'!•.•'• with Medical and Surgical Fee Schedule of the Industrial Commission
V*

'U^

Casing and
result of
accordance
of Utah.

•

^. *
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Mountain States Casing and
P • ". or State Insurance Fund, pay applicant mileage at the rate of 16^ per mile for
'ff, •
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seven round trips between Yakima, Washington and Salt Lake City; and in
addition the State Insurance Fund shall also pay five days of per diem at the
rate of $22.50 per day to the applicant.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendants, Mountain States Casing and
or the State Insurance Fund, pay Chris Nichols, attorney for the applicant,
15% of the foregoing underpayment of temporary total compensation, travel
allowance, and per diem allowance, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid
awards and remitted directly to his office.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the offset of temporary total disability
sought by the State Insurance Fund should be, and the same is hereby denied.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

Vi «i- _day
ISi v . ATTEST
/s/
*f
<.;

of January, 1985

Linda J. Strasburg

Linda J. Strasburg
Commission Secretary
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I certify that on January
A^t)
, 1985 a copy of the
attached Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law was mailed to the following
persons at the following addresses, postage paid:

i

Jerry McKean, 731 East South Temple downstairs apartment, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84102
Chris Nichols, Attorney,
City, Utah 84111

142

East

200

South

//300, Salt

Lake

State Insurance Fund, Dennis Lloyd, Attorney 560 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

>

By

Barbara
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THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case No. 85000085

*
JERRY MCKEAN,
*
DENIAL OF

Applicant,

MOTION FOR REVIEW

vs.

*

MOUNTAIN STATES CASING SERVICES
and/or STATE INSURANCE FUND,
Defendants,

*
*
*
*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On or about January 23, 1985, an Order was entered by an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above
entitled case.

j

On or about January 29, 1985, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Defendants by and through their attorney.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated.
has reviewed the file
in the above entitled case and we are
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of
tive Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts
Fact and Conclusion of Law of the Administrative Law Judge.

Commission for
The Commission
of the opinion
the Administrathe Findings of

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge of January 23, 1985, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied.

Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

A<7#
ATTEST:

^iWlllllr
Stephen M. Hadley
Chairman

_day of February, 1985.

.inda J. ^Strasburg
Commission Secretary

/7

Walter T. Axelgard
Commissioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on February
of Motion for Review was mailed
ng addresses, postage paid:

7^
/
to

1985, a copy of the attached
the following persons at the

Jerry McKean, 731 East South Temple, Downstairs Apartment, SLC,
UT 84102
Chris Nichols, Atty., 142 East 200 South, //300, SLC, UT 84111
Dennis Lloyd, Atty,, State Insurance Fund, 560 South 300 East,
SLC, UT 84111

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
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